The role of scientific paradigms in the assessment of thought Essay Example for Free

The role of scientific paradigms in the assessment of thought EssayThomas Kuhn, in his work entitled The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, discusses the actually nature and necessity of what he calls scientific revolutions. In this particular work, Kuhn sees an apparent parallelism between political revolutions on the one hand, and scientific revolutions on the other. Kuhn writes, Scientific revolutions those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in entirely or in part by an incompatible cutting one (2000, p.503).On a preliminary note, paradigms are frameworks in and through which we approach phenomena, in general. They are models, so to speak. The idea is quite an simple. Let us consider the choice of models in epistemological theory. The traditional epistemological schools of thought rationalism and empiricism contract incompatible models. The model adopted by the rationalists was pure mathematics, whereas the empiricists adopted experimental or empirical science.As one may have already noticed at this point, it is not difficult to see wherefore rationalism and empiricism stand as rival epistemological theories. The choice of model is significant to their first harmonic disagreements. Naturally enough, different models employ different methodologies, different methodologies in turn, generate different types of knowledge, which, consequently, have different criteria of proof or validity. Scientific development, as Kuhn contends, may appropriately be characterized by paradigm shifts and this he calls scientific revolutions.It is burning(prenominal) to note that scientific developments do not occur in a vacuum. For the aforementioned(prenominal) reason, there is a felt need to situate scientific developments in the historical context in spite of appearance which they are conceived, proposed and ultimately, institutionalized and integrated as part of societys shared knowledge. This is to say that scientifi c revolutions are also proper objects of historical analysis and discourse in as much as political revolutions are.Kuhn contends that there is a parallelism between political and scientific revolutions. As pointed out earlier, it is principal(prenominal) to note that he characterizes scientific revolutions as those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one. Kuhns characterization emphasizes two important points. First, that there is a replacement of an old paradigm by a new one.Second, that the new paradigm is not merely something new it is also incompatible with the old paradigm. This is to say that the horror or the irreconcilability of the new paradigm with the old paradigm serves as warrant for the necessity of such a revolution. Although there are significant differences in both scientific and political developments, Kuhn argues that one may be justified in using the notion of revolution as a m etaphor for understanding them.He writes, Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense often restricted to a department of the political community, that existing institutions have ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by the environment that they have in part created. In much the same way, scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the scientific community that an existing paradigm has ceased to black market adequately in the exploration of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had previously led the way (2000, p.503).Kuhns parallelism is thus, founded on the idea that in both fibres, a sense of malfunction in our institutions as for the case of the political, and in our paradigms as for the case of the scientific necessitates for the occurrence of a revolution.References Kuhn, T. (2000). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The Philosophers Handbook. Ed. Stanley Rosen. Random abide New York.